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Valuing Intellectual Property Rights
in an Imperfectly Competitive Market:
A Biopharming Application
Genti Kostandini and Bradford F. Mills
Small research firms developing biotechnology applications often focus on establishing in-
tellectual property rights (IPRs), which can then be sold to more established firms with
existing market channels. This paper presents a method for valuing the IPRs for an innovation
that lowers product production costs below those associated with the patented process of a
monopolist. The application to Glucocerebrosidase enzyme from transgenic tobacco suggests
an IPRs value of about $1.75 billion. Despite the innovator’s market power, significant
surplus gains also accrue to consumers. Further, U.S. antitrust laws that prohibit IPRs ac-
quisition by the current monopolist increase consumer welfare by almost 50%.
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Small research firms in the biopharmaceutical
industry commonly strive to establish intellec-
tual property rights (IPRs) on innovative tech-
nologies that can then be sold to larger firms
with existing market channels. For example, in
2005, the value of the top 10 acquisitions and
product alliances between largepharmaceutical
companies and biotech firms was $15 billion
(Zimm, 2007). In 2004 the large pharmaceuti-
cal company Pfizer paid $1.3 billion for Espe-
rion Therapeutics, a small firm with a drug that
boosts levels of ‘‘good’’ cholesterol (Alpert,
2004). In 2003, companies paid over $5 billion
for six biotech firms (Alpert, 2004). In 2001
Amgen Inc., a large biotech company bought
Immunex Corp. with its very successful drug
Enbrel for about $16 billion (Gillis, 2002),
while in 2000, a total of $2.7 billion was paid
by pharmaceutical companies for seven biotech
acquisitions.
Usually small biotech firms generate bio-
pharming applications to produce lower cost
drugs for markets that are currently served by
just a few (or only one) firms with substantial
market power. At the same time, the U.S. anti-
trust laws prohibit mergers and acquisitions if
they substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly (Clayton Act 1914).1 The
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1Patent acquisition by an incumbent with market
power would not need to be reported in the Federal
Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
of 1978, but still would be a violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act if the patent were the major asset of
the innovator and its acquisition reduced future com-
petition.
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 2009 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationacquisitions of Astra by Zeneca (1999) and of
Marion Merrell Dow by Hoechst (1995) are
examples of proposed mergers that potentially
inhibited new competition and were blocked
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
(Balto and Mongoven, 1999). Thus, FTC reg-
ulations requiring that buyers of small biotech
firms be nonparticipants in the intended market
suggest the acquiring firm will enter as an
oligopolist.
In this paper we assume an innovator enters
the market and competes in quantity using ei-
ther a Cournot or Stackelberg strategy to esti-
mate the potential ex-ante value of IPRs for a
small biotech firm. While a vast literature exists
on the emergence of Cournot and Stackelberg
strategies in oligopoly markets (e.g., Allen,
1992; Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Kreps and
Scheinkman, 1983; Qin and Stuart, 1997;
Robson, 1990;Saloner, 1987;Tasna ´di, 2006), to
our knowledge, these strategies have not been
employed in ex-ante evaluations of process in-
novations, especially in the presence of antitrust
laws.Thisstudy alsocontributestothe literature
on innovative and competitive marketing strat-
egies of biotech firms (e.g., Begemann, 1997;
Renkoski, 1997) as well as IPRs evaluation un-
der different market situations (e.g., Oehmke
and Wolf, 2004) by examining a specific emerg-
ing biopharming innovation. In this case, the
value of IPRs is estimated for an innovating
firm that obtains a patent on the production of
Glucocerebrosidase enzyme (Gaucher’s disease
treatment) from transgenic tobacco. The current
market for Gaucher’s disease treatment is
served by one firm, Genzyme, which has the
most efficient preinnovation process of pro-
duction. Genzyme might potentially offer the
‘highest’ price for the innovator’s IPRs, but
acquisition by the incumbent is likely a viola-
tionofthe ClaytonActandwould beconsidered
illegal by the FTC.2 Therefore, Cournot and
Stackelberg duopolist strategies are simulated
to determine the value of IPRs to the innovator
based on the expected profit stream from com-
petition with the current monopolist. Both pro-
ductionprocesspatentlife and the emergenceof
fringe competition after patent expiration are
considered in estimating the potential profit
stream.3 In addition, consumer welfare effects
are calculated and the results are contrasted
with the scenario where the innovator’s pro-
duction process is acquired by the current sole
market participant, Genzyme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section two provides background information
on biopharming, Gaucher’s disease, and the
Cerezyme market.Themodelused todetermine
the value of the IPRs and welfare changes is
presented in the third section. The therapeutic
proteinproductionprocess,unitcostreductions,
and other data used in the model are presented
insectionfourandex-antebenefitsare provided
in section five. Section six concludes.
Background on Biopharming, Gaucher’s
Disease, and the Cerezyme Market
Biopharming and Transgenic Tobacco
Genetic engineering of plants and animals
holds the promise to produce therapeutic pro-
tein drugs at significantly lower costs than
current pharmaceutical production methods.4
For example, empirical studies of biopharming
show 10–100 times lower production costs
when compared with cell culture systems
(Kusnadi, Nikolov, and Howard, 1997; Misson
and Curling, 2000).5 Further, transgenic plants
are generally preferred to transgenic animals
2Genzyme has the strongest incentives to obtain
the innovator’s IPRs, since it can retain the monopoly
position and reduce some of the losses incurred if the
innovator or a firm acquiring the innovator’s IPRs
enters the market.
3Generic competition leads to prominent revenue
losses for drug companies whose patents expire. For
example, Pfizer may lose almost half of its $51 billion
in 2005 sales, as a result of emerging competition from
generic-drug makers, of products with expiring patents
(Zimm, 2007). Similarly, Merck, the fourth-largest
U.S. drugmaker, may lose $3 billion in sales this year
from its top-selling Zocor cholesterol pill because of
generic competition (Zimm, 2007).
4Protein drugs are the fastest growing area in the
pharmaceutical industry.
5Cell culture systems are the current method of
protein production in the pharmaceutical industry
where the targeted protein is produced by genetically
engineering mammalian or bacterial cells.
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hosting mammalian pathogens) and structur-
ally more fit to produce complex proteins
(Cramer et al., 1996).6 Plant-produced proteins
research is being conducted on a variety of
agricultural crops such as corn, tobacco, potato,
alfalfa, rice, and canola. Some biotech com-
panies such as Large Scale Biology Corp.
and Planet Biotechnology Inc. have targeted
tobacco as a prospective production engine.
Tobacco is considered to be safer than other
potential candidates because of reduced risk of
contaminating the food supply or other non-
genetically modified tobacco.7
Research on tobacco has already achieved
remarkable results and therapeutic proteins
from transgenic tobacco are expected to be
among the first marketed plant-produced med-
icines. Many biotech firms are now conducting
clinical trials with proteins of plant origin,
indicating that commercialization is not far.
CaroRX, for example, is a treatment of dental car-
ies which is already approved for sale in Europe
and it is undergoing stage II U.S. clinical trials.
Gaucher’s Disease
Gaucher’s disease is part of some 30 family-
genetic (inherited) diseases that are identified as
lysosomal storage disorders (Rader, 2003). Per-
sons that suffer from the disease lack the lyso-
somal enzyme Glucocerebrosidase, which is
necessary for breaking down lipids. Lipids build
up in the liver and spleen and result in lung,
bone, kidney problems, and anemia (Goozner,
2002). Gaucher’s disease is also very rare, af-
fecting only about 20,000 people worldwide.8
The genetic defect causing Gaucher’s disease
was discovered in 1964, and the purified Glu-
cocerebrosidase enzyme was first produced in
1974 (Goozner, 2002). The enzyme was initially
purified from human placentas by Genzyme as
the drug Ceredase and the process, approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
1991, was very expensive. Genzyme continued
to produce Ceredase from human placentas until
1995 when it licensed a recombinant version of
the enzyme (Cerezyme) produced in Chinese
Hamster Ovaries (CHO) (Goozner, 2002).9 Cer-
ezyme was found to be a more effective treat-
ment than Ceredase because of a slight ge-
netic modification on the recombinant enzyme
(Rader). Cerezyme is still the most effective
treatment of Gaucher’s disease and can be pro-
duced in larger quantities because it does not
depend on the availability of human placentas.
However, production is still very costly. A pa-
tient must take between 0.25 and 3 grams of
Cerezyme every year at an average annual cost
of $175,000 (Rader, 2003). Studies suggest
that the profit margin of Genzyme in the case
of Cerezyme is more than 90% (e.g., The New
York Times, 2008; Wall Street Journal, 2005).
Cerezyme Market
Genzyme is currently the only provider of a
treatment of Gaucher’s disease in the United
States. There is another product that is approved
in Europe, Zavesca by Oxford Glycosciences
Plc., but it is only used for patients with mild to
moderate disease conditions (Rader, 2003).
Genzyme’s patent on Cerezyme expired in 2001
butits currentmanufacturing method ispatented
until 2011 and its composition until 2013
(Genzyme Corporation, 2005). The market for
Gaucher’s disease treatment has always been a
lucrative market and other companies have tried
to develop more cost effective treatments, so far
without success.10 Thus, Genzyme maintains
substantial market power. In the United States,
the price of Cerezyme has not changed during
6Transgenic plants refer to genetically modified
plants.
7Tobacco does not enter the food or feed supply
and is either harvested before reaching maturity or tops
are cut so that it does not flower and gene flow is
almost entirely eliminated.
8This figure includes people that are taking treat-
ment of Gaucher’s disease and people that have not
started the treatment yet (because the disease is in its
initial stage) but are positively diagnosed.
9Recombinant proteins are proteins produced in
the cells of genetically modified organisms.
10Vevesca, an alternative Gaucher’s disease treat-
ment by Oxford Glycosciences, went through all clin-
ical trials and showed promising results but failed to
gain approval in the United States and Europe because
11% of the patients developed nervous system com-
plications.
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cation of Genzyme’s substantial market power.
The Model
An ex-ante analysis of potential benefits is
conducted since the production of Glucocere-
brosidase enzyme from transgenic tobacco is not
currently being undertaken. The expected value
of IPRs depends on the strategies of the inno-
vating biotech firm (or of the firm that acquires
the innovator’s IPRs) and the incumbent. In this
case Genzyme is assumed to be a perfect mo-
nopoly in the current market for Cerezyme.
Further, the transgenic tobacco product is as-
sumed to be of the same quality as Cerezyme.
The successful developer of the patented trans-
genic production process may follow several
potential strategies to compete with the existing
monopoly, with no clearly preferred strategy
identified in the literature. Some studies support
the emergence of equilibria where firms choose
between Bertrand (price-setting) and Cournot
(quantity-setting) strategies (Allen, 1992; Qin
and Stuart, 1997). Other studies support the
emergence of a unique Cournot equilibrium
(Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Tasna ´di, 2006),
and the emergence of a unique Stackelberg equi-
librium (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Robson,
1990; Saloner, 1987). Font and Kanavos (2007)
examine the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and
find that competitive effects in the U.S. phar-
maceutical markets follow a Cournot model.
The present study explores Cournot and Stack-
elberg strategies.11 A number of authors (e.g.,
Rausser, Scotchmer, and Simon, 1999; Teece,
1987) note that IPRs alone do not ensure the
appropriation of profits by innovators. Rather,
IPRs have to be combined with a range of
complementary assets such as marketing and
distribution networks. In the case of Cerezyme,
insurance companies can be thought of as
complementaryassetsin distribution,as they are
willing to support the high market price (CNN,
2005). However, with the emergence of com-
petition and the drop in prices it is not in the
interest ofinsurance companies to stay ‘loyal’to
Genzyme and these ‘complementary assets’ will
be available to the innovator and the generic
competition as well.
Exact specifications of demand and marginal
cost curve are needed in order to calculate the
profit stream to the innovator, the change in
incumbent’s profits, and the consumer surplus
generated from the biopharming application un-
der each strategy. For simplicity, the Cerezyme
market is characterized by linear marginal cost
and demand functions derived from information
on prices, quantities, and elasticities.12
Under these assumptions the demand for
Cerezyme in price dependent form is:
(1) P5m   lQd,
where P is the price of one unit of Cerezyme,
Qd is the quantity demanded and m and l are
the intercept and slope terms, respectively.
Thus the marginal revenue curve is:
(2) MR5m   2lQ.
Similarly, a linear marginal cost curve of Cer-
ezyme (in price dependent form) can be spec-
ified as:
(3) P5y1hQ,
where QS is the quantity of Cerezyme produced
and y and h are the intercept and slope terms,
respectively.
In the absence of information on the spe-
cific nature of the marginal cost shift associated
with the innovation, a parallel shift is usually
employed, with a pivotal shift providing a dis-
tinct contrast in sensitivity analysis.13
11The Bertrand strategy is relatively trivial with the
innovator charging a markup slightly less than the
marginal cost advantage over the incumbent, and
serving the whole market. The Bertrand strategy is
also less profitable for both the innovator and the
incumbent. Therefore, we focus on Cournot and
Stackelberg strategies.
12These can be thought of as first-order approxi-
mations of the true underlying marginal cost and
demand functions.
13Several studies including Alston, Norton, and
Pardey (1996) have found that generally, functional
forms and elasticities are relatively unimportant in
determining the size of total benefits compared with
the nature of the supply shift. On the other hand, when
determining the distribution of benefits, functional
forms are relatively unimportant compared with the
sizes of elasticities and the nature of the supply shift.
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shift is represented as:
(4) P5 y   k ðÞ 1hQS,
where k is the size of the unit cost reduction ex-
pressed as cost savings for each gram of Gluco-
cerebrosidase enzyme produced from transgenic
tobacco compared with cell culture systems.
For comparison a pivotal marginal cost shift











The incumbent as a monopolist charges a
price mark-up above the marginal cost curve of:
(6)







ofdemand(PED) and the marginal cost curve of
the monopolist. The point where the marginal
cost curve and the marginal revenue curve meet
is derived from Equation (6) and it is used to
obtain the slope and intercept parameters of the
marginal cost curves in Equations (4) and (5).
Cournot Model
Under the Cournot model both incumbent and
entrant choose the quantities produced in re-
sponse to the quantity of the other firm. In
equilibrium, both firms maximize profits based
on consistent beliefs about the other’s output.
Denote the incumbent’s output level as q1, the
innovator’soutputlevelas q2, andthe aggregate
output as Q 5 q1 1 q2. Firm 1 has a cost
function given by c1(q1) and firm 2 has a cost
function given by c2(q2). The maximization
problem of firm 1 is:
(7) maxq1 P1ðq1, q2Þ5pðq1 1q2Þq1   c1ðq1Þ.
Similarly, the maximizationproblem offirm 2 is:
(8) maxq2 P2ðq1, q2Þ5pðq1 1q2Þq2   c2ðq2Þ.
With consistent conjectures the solutions to the
simultaneous equations from the first order
conditions are:
(9) q1* 5





lðm   2y2 1y1Þ1h1ðm   y2Þ
lð3l12h2 12h1Þ1h1h2
.
Based on equilibrium quantities, profits for
each firm, the equilibrium market price, and the
change in consumer surplus generated from the
entrance of firm 2 can also be calculated.
Stackelberg Model
In the Stackelberg model one firm moves first,
and then the other firm follows after observing
the first firm’s output. Again, the optimal out-
put for the leader depends on consistent beliefs
on how the follower responds. In the present
study the incumbent is the follower and the
innovating firm is the leader due to its entrance
at a lower marginal cost.14 To solve for equi-
librium outputs we start from stage two and
maximize the incumbent’s profit as:
(11) maxq1 P1ðq1, q2Þ5pðq1 1q2Þq1   c1ðq1Þ.
Equation (11) is similar to the Cournot condi-
tion derived above. Moving from the second
stage to the first, the innovator now wants to
choose its optimal level of output based on the
incumbent’s response. The profit maximization
of the innovator in this case is:
(12)
maxq2 P2ðq1, q2Þ5pðf 1ðq2Þ1q2Þq2
  c2ðq2Þ.
From the first order conditions of Equations
(11) and (12) the optimal output of the inno-
vator and the incumbent are, respectively:
(13) q2* 5





m   lq2*   y1
2l1h1
.
14Harsanyi and Selten (1998) and Van Damme and
Hurkens (1998) have shown that in a two-stage game
the lowest cost firm emerges as the endogenous
Stackelberg leader.
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surplus are again calculated based on the
equilibrium quantities of the incumbent and
innovator.
The Value of IPRs
If the market is served by only one firm, ac-
quisition of the innovator’s IPRs by the incum-
bent allows it to obtain a patent on a more ef-
ficient manufacturing method and to retain a
monopoly position in the market. As mentioned,
such an acquisition likely violates Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The innovator’s patent can,
however, be purchased by another pharmaceu-
tical firm not currently in the market and that is
the case we consider. The effective patent life in
the pharmaceutical industry is 12 years and
that’s the innovator’s patent life assumed here.15
The innovator may attempt to prolong the pro-
cess patent life through an ‘evergreening’ strat-
egy of minor process innovation (in which case
the IPRs will be higher) but since there is no
information on any such strategies, for the pur-
pose of this study we assume a12-year patent
life. Thus if the incumbent has operated for
t-years in the market, the remaining patent life
for the incumbent is 12 minus t-years. The value
of the innovator’s IPRs is calculated as the pre-
sent value (PV) of the expected stream of profits
during the effective patent life when it enters the
market andcompetes withtheincumbent. In this
particular application, based on current patents,
it is assumed that the incumbent’s manufactur-
ing method is patent protected for 6 more years
and after that period it faces generic competition
in the market.16 Thus the present value of the
expected stream ofinnovator’s profits is the sum
of profits during the first 6 years as a Cournot or
Stackelberg competitor plus the profits from the
6th to the 12th year when facing a competitive
fringe after the incumbent’s patent expires.17
After the 12th year incumbent’s profits are
driven to zero because generics are produced
using the incumbent’s production method.18
Evidence from the entry of generics in phar-
maceutical markets suggests that the price of
existing products falls dramatically (Food and
Drug Administration, 2006). To simplify the
analysis, it is assumed that when facing a com-
petitive fringe in years 6–12 the innovator can
drive out the competition in the market through
limit pricing.19
During the limit price period, the expected







where k denotes the size of unit cost reduction,
cQ
0 denotes the quantity that would result if the
market was competitive with the incumbent’s
technology evaluated over the time generics
may enter the market, t 5 6, until the innova-
tor’s patentexpires, t 512, and r is the discount
rate.







where PB is the price of innovator’s IPRs, Pt is
the potential annual profit of the innovator
15Studies have found the effective patent life
for pharmaceuticals to be 11–12 years on average
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1994; Shulman, DiMasi,
and Kaitin, 1999).
16Given the R&D situation in the glucocerebrosid-
ase market, it is unlikely that competitors with further
process innovations will emerge during the ‘‘effective’’
life of the patent. However, the framework can be
adjusted to accommodate a variety of cases including
the emergence of other competitors with new products
or processes in the market under an oligopoly setting.
17The innovator enters the market with a different
production process and, to the best of our knowledge,
does not need to use any of the incumbent’s patented
process or technologies patented by a third party. But if
patented processes from the incumbent or a third party
are used, then the innovator would pay royalties and
the value of IPRs would be lower.
18It is assumed that at this point generics are
perfect substitutes for the original product.
19At the limit price the innovator faces an elastic
demand because it gains thewhole market with a small
price decrease. However the equilibrium price may not
drop to the incumbent’s marginal cost if they continue
to play Cournot or Stackelberg with the incumbent or
with the incumbent and a limited set of entrants. In this
case the innovator’s profits are underestimated under
the limit pricing assumption.
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is the expected value of profits during the limit
price period.
The PV of changes in consumer surplus
under a duopoly at time 0 until the time in-















0 are the monopoly price and
quantity with the incumbent’s technology prior
to innovator’s entry, mP1
i and mQ1
i are the
resulting equilibrium price and quantity after
the innovator enters the market following a
Cournot or Stackelberg strategy (i 5 Cournot,
Stackelberg), t denotes each year from the time
of the buyout until the incumbent’s patent
expires.
The PV of changes in consumer surplus,
DCSg from the time when generics may enter
the market, t 5 6, until the innovator’s patent
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cQ1   0:5ðm   mP1ÞmQ1 g
ð11rÞ
t ,
where m is the intercept of the demand curve,
cP
0 is the competitive price in the market with
the incumbent’s technology,
mP
1 is the mo-
nopoly price with the innovator’s technology,
mQ
1 is the quantity supplied at that price.20
It is important to note that the innovator and
potential buyers are assumed to have the same
information regarding market demand, firm
marginal cost, and the time when generics may
potentially enter the market. Otherwise, the
price that potential buyers offer is different
from the anticipated value of IPRs to the in-
novator. In order to highlight the role of the
antitrust laws in augmenting consumer welfare
we also calculate profits and welfare changes if
the incumbent was allowed to acquire the in-
novator’s technology. Under this scenario, the
PV of changes in consumer surplus at time 0
(when the incumbent acquires the innovator’s
IPRs) until the time incumbent’s patent expires,












1 are the resulting monopoly






monopoly price and quantity with the incum-
bent’s technology.
If the innovator accepts the offer, the PV at
time 0 of nominal changes in incumbent’s










The real change in profits to the incumbent in
this case is found by adding to its current ex-
pected profits (with the incumbent’s technol-
ogy) the change in monopoly profits using the
innovator’s technology (during the first 6
years), the profits during the limit price period
from t 5 6t ot 5 12 in Equation (15), and
subtracting the price paid for IPRs to the
innovator.
Protein Production Process, Unit Cost
Reductions, and Other Model Data
Cell Culture Systems versus Transgenic Plants
A comparison of the unit cost of Glucocere-
brosidase enzyme from CHO and the unit cost
reduction from transgenic tobacco provides an
example of the relative costs of cell culture and
transgenic plants as systems for therapeutic
protein production. Production of proteins from
transgenic plants is similar to the production of
proteins from the more established method of
bioreactors using cell cultures. In both systems
protein production can be divided into up-
stream and downstream processing. During
upstream processing the proteins are produced
in genetically engineered cells that express the
desired proteins. Downstream processing then
isolates and purifies the proteins.
20The assumption here is that generic competition
will have the same costs as the monopoly. Given the
highly technical nature of the production process of
glucocerebrosidase enzyme in culture cells, followed
by purification to extract the enzyme, it is unlikely that
production outside the United States will result in
lower costs for generic producers.
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tures produced in bioreactors in the upstream
process and also provide further cost savings in
the downstream process.21 The economic ad-
vantages that transgenic plants can offer from
the expression of proteins in their cells are
lower capital requirements compared with
bioreactors, lower manufacturing costs, and
flexibility in supply. Increasing production ca-
pacity with cell culture systems requires a
considerable fixed investment (more than $50
million for a bioreactor plant) and construction
time (at least 5 years). Using transgenic plants
for protein production is less expensive and
production capacity can be extended by simply
planting more acres. Glucocerebrosidase en-
zyme was successfully produced in transgenic
tobacco by CropTech (Blacksburg, VA). Crop
Tech’s estimates indicate that 1 mg of crude
Glucocerebrosidase enzyme can be produced
from 1g of fresh weight of tobacco leaf tissue
(Cramer et al., 1996).22 Assuming a 40% re-
covery in order to achieve a pure product, and
40 metric tons of tobacco per acre (based on
multiple cuttings), less than one acre of trans-
genic tobacco will be sufficient to meet Gen-
zyme’s current level of Glucocerebrosidase
enzyme production.23 This low acreage sug-
gests that the innovation will have little to no
impact on existing U.S. tobacco markets.
Unit Cost Reductions
Economic analysis of the production of thera-
peutic proteins from transgenic plants has been
limited to date, largely because there is no drug
of transgenic plant origin currently on the
market. Consequently, there is no commercial
scale processing of transgenic plants to gener-
ate accurate data on the economic benefits of
biopharming. Nevertheless, estimates do exist
on the production costs of proteins from
transgenic plants (Evangelista et al., 1998;
Farid, 2007; Kusnadi, Nikolov, and Howard,
1997; Misson and Curling, 2000; Nikolov and
Woodard, 2004). Several important results can
be synthesized from these studies. First, the
cost savings with transgenic plant systems are
realized during the upstream process and the
downstream process (Glacken, 2002; Nikolov
and Woodard, 2004; Watler, 2002). Down-
stream processing includes filtration and puri-
fication using chromatography that account for
30% of the production costs (Millan et al.,
2003). Second, the unit cost reduction in the
upstream process is primarily due to capital
cost savings. In transgenic plants, capital costs
can be more than 95% lower than those in cell
culture systems. Capital costs for cell culture
systems can constitute 20–30% or more of
protein production costs, but they depend on
the size of the operation. However, a significant
share of incumbent’s capital costs, especially in
bioreactor infrastructure, is fixed in the short to
medium term.
There have been several studies on the cost
of therapeutic proteins. For example, Myleski,
Oishi, and Williams (2004) review reports on
the cost comparison between transgenic plants
and cell culture systems in bioreactors and
point out that the cost of therapeutic protein
production from transgenic plants may be from
10% up to an order of magnitude lower than
cell culture systems. Farid (2007) provides an
extensive literature review on the economics
of protein production using bioreactors and
transgenic plants. He notes that besides sig-
nificant capital savings, transgenic plants also
offer manufacturing costs (excluding capital
investments and R&D costs) as low as one sixth
of the costs of pharmaceutical proteins when
compared with bioreactors. For example,
manufacturing costs are in the order of $50 per
gram of pharmaceutical protein produced in
transgenic corn, whereas they vary from $300–
3000 per gram for a 100 kg/year facility (in-
cluding bioreactor and downstream produc-
tion). The author concludes that transgenic
21Bioreactors are large containers made of stain-
less steel, glass, or plastic, which serve as a growth
medium for the genetically engineered mammalian or
bacterial cells in cell culture systems.
22It is expected that the innovator’s product will
have a distinct composition that allows it to be IPR-
protected and marketed.
23There is very little risk and uncertainty associ-
ated with agricultural production in this case. The
small tobacco acreage required to meet the demand for
glucocerebrosidase enzyme can be met through green-
house production in several geographical locations.
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magnitudereductioninthe manufacturingcosts
of goods per gram compared with CHO culture
systems at the 100 kg/year scale. Wilke and
Katzek’s (2003) study on the same topic sup-
ports these estimates. Other studies on output
levels of 50 kg/year estimate unit cost reduc-
tions of 25–28% (Glacken, 2002) and 20–40%
(Watler, 2002). Annual production of Gluco-
cerebrosidase enzyme is less than 50 kg per
year commercially. Thus, there is uncertainty
about the exact unit cost reduction, but they can
reasonably be assumed to range from a mini-
mum of 10% up to a maximum of 40%, with a
most likely value of 25% of the original pro-
duction cost.
Market Data
Estimates of the elasticity of supply of Cer-
ezyme or similar products are not available in
the literature. Nevertheless, considering that
Genzyme is currently the only provider of a
treatment of Gaucher’s disease, information on
prices and quantities over time may help to
shed some light on the nature of the supply
curve.24 Cerezyme prices, quantities, and
changes in quantity for five recent years are
shown in Table 1. The direct price that Gen-
zyme charges for Cerezyme has not changed
from 1994 to 2004 and the initial price (
mP
0)o f
Cerezyme in the analysis is $740 per 200 unit
vial.25 Because the quantity has been constantly
increasing, taking an average for recent years
would likely underestimate the ex-ante benefits
of the transgenic product.26 Therefore, the ini-
tial quantity (
mQ
0) is set equal to the quantity in
2003. The upward trend in the quantity of
Cerezyme produced also suggests that Genzyme
currently has some excess capacity and that the
supply of Cerezyme is elastic. Forthe study, the
elasticity of supply is considered to be 2.0.
Demand, on the other hand, appears to be
inelastic since a very limited number of people
are carriers of the Gaucher’s disease and only a
few persons are diagnosed each year. Regular
Cerezyme treatment of patients that are already
diagnosed can successfully control and reverse
severe conditions from the disease (spleen and
liver enlargement, bone disease, anemia).
However, microeconomic theory suggests that
a monopolist maximizing its profits will never
operate in the inelastic portion of the demand
curve. Consequently, the elasticity of demand
is considered to be 21.25.
Results
The estimated value of IPRs along with the
changes in incumbent’s profits (DP) and con-
sumer surplus changes (DCS) are presented in
Table 2 for a minimum unit cost reduction of
10%, a most likely reduction of 25%, and a
maximum reduction of 40% under both parallel
and pivotal marginal costshifts. Anelasticity of
demand of 21.25 and an elasticity of supply of
2.0 are used in these estimates. With linear
marginal cost and demand specifications, and
initial equilibrium prices and quantities, the
changes in incumbent’s profits, innovator’s pro-
fits, and consumer surplus are calculated sim-
ply by using the area changes in consumer and
producer welfare based on supply and demand
curves and price changes. All results are re-
ported as present values over a 12 year period
using a 5% discount rate.
The estimated value of IPRs with the most
likely unit cost reduction is $1.72 billion if the
innovator follows a Cournot strategy and $1.77
billion if it follows a Stackelberg strategy.27 For
a pivotal shift, the most likely unit cost reduc-
tion generates IPRs valued at $1.72 and $1.81
billionunder Cournot and Stackelberg strategies,
24We use the elasticity of supply to derive the slope
of the marginal cost curve.
25Genzyme is the decision maker when it comes to
the price of Cerezyme. The high price of Cerezyme is
justified by the company as it ‘‘... allows the company
to continue to develop other medications and fund
programs that provide small amounts of treatments at
no cost’’ (Wall Street Journal, 2005).
26Analysis over 12 year period may still underes-
timate the value of IPRs by assuming constant number
of cases of Gaucher’s Disease.
27If the innovator follows a Bertrand strategy, the
incumbent exits the market and the estimated value of
IPRs is $614 million. Thus, it is in the incumbent’s and
innovator’s interest to follow either Cournot or Stack-
elberg strategies.
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introduction of Glucocerebrosidase enzyme
from transgenic tobacco in the market regard-
less of the entry strategy of the innovator. A
25% unit cost reduction with a parallel shift
generates increases of $4.2 and $4.8 billion in
consumer surplus under Cournot and Stackel-
berg strategies, respectively. Changes in con-
sumer surplus are also slightly larger under a
pivotal shift compared with a parallel shift for
both strategies. As expected, the incumbent’s
profits decrease with the innovator’s entry.
Further, the innovator’s IPRs value increases
and incumbent’s profits decrease with larger
unit cost reductions under both parallel and
pivotal marginal cost shifts.28 In addition, the
value of IPRs and the decrease in incumbent’s
profits are slightly larger under a pivotal shift
compared with a parallel shift in marginal costs.
The impact of antitrust laws is also illus-
trated by reporting results in Table 3 for the
case when the incumbent is allowed to acquire
the innovator’s IPRs. Contrasting the results
with those in Table 2, two observations are
worth noting. First, in both scenarios con-
sumers are the main beneficiaries from the in-
novation. But the consumers gain significantly
less if the incumbent acquires the innovator’s
IPRs. A $2.9 billion increase in consumer sur-
plus is generated if the incumbent buys the
innovator’s IPRs, compared with the previously
mentioned gains in consumer surplus of $4.2
and $4.8 billion if the incumbent competes with
the innovator using Cournot and Stackelberg
strategies, respectively.
Second, as expected, the incumbent’s profits
decrease by less when it buys the innovator’s
IPRs than when it faces an entrant and com-
petes as a duopoly. If the incumbent acquires
the innovators IPRs, with a 25% unit cost re-
duction and a parallel shift in the marginal cost
curve, the reduction of the incumbent’s profits
is about $1.3 billion when the IPRs of the in-
novator are priced based on potential profit
streams from either Cournot or Stackelberg
strategies. Incumbent’s profit reductions are
also lower as the unit cost reduction increases,
as larger unit cost reductions translate into
greater profits. These reductions compare
favorably with the $1.6 and $2.1 billion re-
ductions in profits associated with competing
under Cournot and Stackelberg strategies, re-
spectively. The choice between a parallel and a
pivotal shift does not significantly impact re-
ductions in incumbent’s profits. Thus, the in-
cumbent’s best strategy would be to acquire the
innovator’s technology, since incumbent’s
profits decrease less and it can effectively ex-
tend the life of patented IPRs. However, as
noted, Federal antitrust regulations are likely to
block this strategy.
The sensitivity of the results to demand and
supply elasticity parameter estimates are also
considered by examining alternative demand
elasticities between 21.001 and 21.5 and al-
ternative supply elasticities between 1.5 and
2.5. The results are found to be generally











1999 479 647,297 — 740
2000 537 725,676 12 740
2001 570 770,270 6 740
2002 620 837,838 9 740
2003 734 991,892 18 740
Notes: Prices represent the direct prices charged from the company for the 200 unit vial and sales of Cerezyme are the revenues
of Genzyme for each year from charging the direct price.
Source: Marketing Research Bureau (2004).
28The incumbent still makes profits but these
profits are less than the profits when it was a monopoly
in the Cerezyme market. Base monopoly profit for the
incumbent is $2.98 billion.
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elasticities. However, the results do appear to
be more sensitive to the precisionofthe supply
elasticity estimates than the demand elasticity
estimates. Holding the supply elasticity con-
stant, incumbent’s losses, profits to the inno-
vator, and changes in consumer surplus in-
crease (decrease) as demand becomes less
(more) elastic under both Cournot and Stack-
elberg strategies and for both types of margi-
nal cost shifts. With the elasticity of demand
held constant, changes in the supply elasticity
do not yield as uniform a set of trends across
the various scenarios. Incumbent’s losses in-
crease (decrease) as supply becomes more
(less) elastic, for both types of marginal cost
shifts and under both entry strategies. How-
ever, the innovator’s profits increase (de-
crease) with an increase (decrease) in supply
elasticity under a parallel shift and decrease
under a pivotal shift under Cournot strategy.
Under Stackelberg strategy, profits to the in-
novator increase with increases in the supply
elasticity for both types of marginal cost
shifts. Consumers gain less as supply becomes
more elastic when the innovator enters as a
Cournot competitor under both parallel and
pivotal marginal cost shift. On the other hand,
when the innovator enters as a Stackelberg
competitor, changes in consumer surplus in-
crease under a parallel shift, but decrease under




Unit Cost Reduction (%MC) 10 25 40
DP Incumbent – Cournot (1,338,421) (1,277,896) (1,216,276)
DP Incumbent – Stackelberg (1,386,274) (1,327,338) (1,267,342)
DCS 2,890,855 2,944,534 2,999,141
Pivotal Shift
DP Incumbent – Cournot (1,356,215) (1,322,652) (1,288,306)
DP Incumbent – Stackelberg (1,417,778) (1,408,664) (1,401,910)
DCS 2,882,764 2,924,950 2,968,920
Note: Results in parenthesis indicate negative changes in profits.
Table 2. Estimated Surplus Changes from Minimum, Most Likely, and Maximum Expected Unit
Cost Reduction under Cournot and Stackelberg (PV, in thousand U.S. dollars)
Parallel Shift
Unit Cost Reduction 10 25 40
Cournot P Innovator 1,513,986 1,718,357 1,923,490
DP Incumbent (1,616,664) (1,638,083) (1,659,335)
DCS 4,137,922 4,162,372 4,186,923
Stackelberg P Innovator 1,561,840 1,767,800 1,974,556
DP Incumbent (2,085,977) (2,110,153) (2,133,999)
DCS 4,757,355 4,795,163 4,833,185
Pivotal Shift
Cournot P Innovator 1,515,601 1,723,946 1,935,078
DP Incumbent (1,617,410) (1,640,606) (1,664,431)
DCS 4,138,770 4,165,265 4,192,856
Stackelberg P Innovator 1,577,164 1,809,959 2,048,682
DP Incumbent (2,093,708) (2,130,623) (2,168,600)
DCS 4,769,364 4,827,759 4,889,713
Note: Results in parenthesis indicate negative changes in profits.
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The economics of innovation in an imperfectly
competitive market are explored for the case of
a small biotech firm successfully generating a
lower cost process of production by bio-
pharming. We estimate the value of the inno-
vator’s IPRs and the potential distribution of
economic gains from entrance into a market
with an incumbent monopolist. The analysis
suggests the innovator’s IPRs have a value of
about $1.75 billion. Thus, potential profits are
very large and capable of spurring significant
investments in innovations for biopharming for
therapeutic protein production. However, it is
worth noting that entry costs and the costs as-
sociated with FDA registration and approval
are not disclosed by Genzyme or similar
pharmaceutical companies that are conducting
clinical trials. These costs are considered a
sunk cost along with R&D costs, and are not
included in the welfare analysis. Yet, even with
significant profits consumers remain the main
beneficiaries from the lower cost process of
producing Glucocerebrosidase enzyme from
transgenic tobacco.
The FTC has established antitrust laws that
prevent an incumbent from retaining market
power by buying the IPRs of a potential rival.
The present case demonstrates the effective-
ness of such antitrust laws in increasing ben-
efits to consumers from technical innovations.
In the presence of antitrust regulations con-
sumer surplus is almost 50% higher than when
the incumbent is allowed to acquire the inno-
vator’s production process. Thus, regulations
can play an important role in redistributing
innovation benefits to a wider share of society,
albeit while slightly blunting incentives for
innovation. This particular application fo-
cused on the value of IPRs from producing an
identical product using a lower cost bio-
pharming production method. Applications
to the more common set of nonidentical prod-
ucts, which may be broadly equivalent in
terms of their same therapeutic effects, are an
important area of future research.
[Received December 2007; Accepted December 2008.]
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